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♦ Shuttle PRA Evolution
♦ Overall Risk
♦ Top Risk Drivers
♦ Risk by Phase
♦ Risk by Element
♦ Lessons Learned
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• As improvements are made to the Shuttle or its processes and as more is learned 
regarding its operation, the Shuttle PRA is updated
• Updates incorporated into Iteration 3.2 include 
− Addition of Orbiter Flight Software
− Updated Pyro modeling
− Incorporation of Orbiter Review Summit comments
− Updated MMOD and Ascent Debris
− Data was updated based upon iteration 3.0 review.
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The following table is a cross-referenced list showing the features included in each 
model iteration.
Model Features
Model Iteration
1.0 2.0 2.1 2.2 3.0 3.1 3.2
Integrated Model       
Phased Approach       
Engineering and Peer Reviewed Data      
Documented Model      
TPS Inspection and Repair    
Contingency Shuttle Crew Support (CSCS)    
Intact Aborts (RTLS, TAL, ATO)   
Collision During Rendezvous and Docking   
Orbiter Flight Software 
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• The Shuttle PRA has been incrementally developed over many years
- Mission Phases (Ascent, Orbit, Entry)
- Number of Systems Modeled
- Risk Factors considered (systems failures, phenomenological failures, human reliability, external 
events, etc.)
• The advent of established NASA requirements, standards, and tools - as well as the 
development of a strong shuttle program PRA team have resulted in significant recent progress
• Iteration 3.2 is the most comprehensive Shuttle PRA to date
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INCREASING FIDELITY AND EXPANDED SCOPE
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• The mean probability of LOCV for Shuttle as currently calculated by iteration 3.2 of the SPRA is:
Mean – 1.1E-02 (1:89)
Median – 1.1E-02 (1:93)
5th percentile – 7.9E-03 (1:130)
95th percentile – 1.6E-02 (1:63)
• This is a decrease from SPRA Iteration 3.1 which had a mean estimate of 1:85 
• Considering the improvements that have been made, these results are consistent with an 
empirical calculation of 2 failures in 131 missions which gives a 1 in 66 probability of LOCV
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Rank %age of Total
Cumulative 
Total
Point Estimate 
Probability
(1:n)
Failure Scenario Description
1 29.4 29.4
3.3E-03
(1:300)
Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris 
(MMOD) strikes Orbiter on orbit leading 
to LOCV on orbit or entry
2 13.4 42.8
1.5E-03
(1:670)
Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME)-
induced SSME catastrophic failure
3 9.5 52.3
1.1E-03
(1:940)
Ascent debris strikes Orbiter Thermal 
Protection System (TPS) leading to LOCV 
on orbit or entry
4 7.3 59.6
8.2E-04
(1:1200)
Crew error during entry
5 5.8 65.4
6.5E-04
(1:1500)
Reusable Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM)-
induced RSRM catastrophic failure
6 2.0 67.4
2.3E-04
(1:4400)
Orbiter flight software error results in 
catastrophic failure during ascent
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Rank %age of Total
Cumulative 
Total
Point Estimate 
Probability
(1:n)
Failure Scenario Description
7 1.6 69.0
1.8E-04
(1:5600)
Ammonia Boiler System (ABS) isolation 
valve leaks on Orbit overcooling the H20 
loops and crew is unable to prevent rupture 
of the interchanger resulting in  Loss of All 
Cooling
8 1.5 70.5
1.7E-04
(1:5900)
Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) APU shaft seal 
fracture
9 1.2 71.7
1.3E-04
(1:7600)
Flow Control Valve (FCV) poppet failure 
causes rupture in the GH2 re-
pressurization line
10 1.2 72.9
1.3E-04
(1:7700)
Collision of the Orbiter with the 
International Space Station (ISS) during 
rendezvous and docking
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ELEMENT OR MAJOR AREA*
1.E-05 1.E-04 1.E-03 1.E-02 1.E-01
MMOD
Orbiter Hardware / 
Software
SSME
Human Error
Ascent Debris
SRB
RSRM
External Tank
1:300
1:350
1:610
1:770
1:930
1:1500
1:1500
1:5000
* Some overlap in risk exists.  For example, a cut set containing both a mechanical failure and a human error that 
result in failure to lower the landing gear is counted in both the Orbiter hardware contributor and the human error 
contributor.
Micrometeoroid 
And Orbital Debris
Space Shuttle Main 
Engines (SSME)
Solid Rocket Booster 
(SRB)
Reusable Solid 
Rocket Motor (RSRM)
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1.E-04 1.E-03 1.E-02
Ascent
Orbit
Entry
1.E-04 1.E-03 1.E-02
Ascent
Orbit
Entry
ESTIMATED PHASE CONTRIBUTIONS TO WHEN LOCV IS INITIATED
ESTIMATED PHASE CONTRIBUTIONS TO WHEN LOCV IS REALIZED
Phase 5th Mean 95th
Ascent 1:350 1:200 1:110
Orbit 1:340 1:210 1:130
Entry 1:1100 1:700 1:460
Phase 5th Mean 95th
Ascent 1:480 1:260 1:150
Orbit 1:1100 1:570 1:320
Entry 1:280 1:180 1:110
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• Intact abort due to Benign Engine Shutdown or Stuck Throttle represent 
<1% of the overall risk. 
− The probability of a Benign Engine Shutdown is ~ 1:320
− Return to Launch Site (RTLS) abort represents the largest fraction of the abort risk 
(57%) mainly due to the higher likelihood of having an engine out early
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• Iteration 3.2 of the SPRA lends itself to any number of sensitivities being 
performed; however, given its current applications, the following sensitivities 
studies were considered to be the most informative:
− No late inspection
• In this sensitivity the basic event capturing the probability of detecting damage during late inspection is set 
to 1.0 and the false positive TPS damage during late inspection and late inspection induced TPS damage 
are set to zero.
− No crew rescue
• In this sensitivity crew rescue is set to 1.0 and the risk from false positive TPS damage is zeroed out 
because since there is no critical damage the vehicle returns safely
− No TPS repair
• In this sensitivity the all TPS damages are considered irreparable and crew rescue is chosen as the 
mitigation for detected critical damage
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• Establish project management and funding through the same path
• If you don’t, your team will have different bosses thus you will not have a 
team
• Establish a single overall PRA technical authority
• Don’t call desired methods as guidelines, if you want the team to follow 
them…
• Document, document, document (capture the basis of the PRA) 
provide tracability (the rabbit trail) of assumptions to results, if you 
wait to document after presenting the results you will be 
embarrassed as a minimum.  
• Get buy in from domain experts early (i.e. before going to present 
to management)
LESSONS LEARNED
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• Start the independent peer review up front with them reviewing the 
plan, then coming back later to ensure that the plan was followed 
correctly (also make sure you are ready for the peer review).  The 
peer review should cover both the scope/content of the PRA as 
well as the PRA methodology used.
• Configuration control should be initiated when the PRA is initiated.
• Begin with the end in mind.  Sounds simple.  Now try 
implementing it.  
• Get the Hazard analysis, FMEA, and PRA teams working together versus 
answering the same questions with different approaches and minimum to 
no communication and/or integration.
• Mission phases definition is very important as the number of potential 
phases increases the complexity of the model orders of magnitude.  For 
example, abort modeling from ascent to on-orbit initiated.  
LESSONS LEARNED (Cont’d)
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• The Shuttle is a very reliable vehicle in comparison with other launch systems.  
Much of the risk posed by Shuttle operations is related to fundamental 
aspects of the spacecraft design and the environments in which it operates.  It 
is unlikely that significant design improvements can be implemented to 
address these risks prior to the end of the Shuttle program.
• The model will continue to be used to identify possible emerging risk drivers 
and allow management to make risk-informed decisions on future missions.  
Potential uses of the SPRA in the future include:
− Calculate risk impact of various mission contingencies (e.g. late inspection, crew 
rescue, etc.)
− Assessing the risk impact of various trade studies (e.g. flow control valves)
− Support risk analysis on mission specific events, such as in flight anomalies.
− Serve as a guiding star and data source for future NASA programs
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Rank %age of Total
Cumulativ
e Total % Probability Description Phase Initiated Phase Realized
1 29.4 29.4 3.3E-03(1 in 300)
Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) strikes Orbiter on orbit 
leading to LOCV on orbit or entry Orbit Orbit, Entry
2 13.4 42.8 1.5E-03(1 in 670)
Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME)-induced SSME catastrophic 
failure Ascent Ascent
3 9.5 52.3 1.1E-03(1 in 940)
Ascent debris strikes Orbiter Thermal Protection System (TPS) 
leading to LOCV on orbit or entry Ascent Orbit, Entry
4 7.3 59.6 8.2E-04(1 in 1200) Crew error during entry Entry Entry
5 5.8 65.4 6.5E-04(1 in 1500)
Reusable Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM)-induced RSRM catastrophic 
failure Ascent Ascent
6 2.0 67.4 2.3E-04(1 in 4400)
Orbiter flight software error results in catastrophic failure during 
ascent Ascent Ascent
7 1.6 69.0 1.8E-04(1 in 5600)
Ammonia Boiler System (ABS) isolation valve leaks on Orbit 
overcooling the H20 loops and crew is unable to prevent rupture of 
the interchanger resulting in  Loss of All Cooling
Orbit Orbit
8 1.5 70.5 1.7E-04(1 in 5900) Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) APU shaft seal fracture Ascent Ascent
9 1.2 71.7 1.3E-04(1 in 7600)
Flow Control Valve (FCV) poppet failure causes rupture in the GH2 
re-pressurization line Ascent Ascent
10 1.2 72.9 1.3E-04(1 in 7700)
Collision of the Orbiter with the International Space Station (ISS) 
during rendezvous and docking Orbit Orbit
11 1.1 74.0 1.3E-04(1 in 7900) Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) external leak on entry Entry Entry
12 1.0 75.0 1.2E-04(1 in 8600) SRB booster separation motor debris strikes Orbiter windows Ascent Ascent
COMPLETE LIST OF SPRA ITERATION 3.2 
CONTRIBUTIONS BY SCENARIO
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Rank %age of Total
Cumulative 
Total % Probability Description Phase Initiated Phase Realized
13 1.0 76.0 1.1E-04(1 in 8900) Reaction Control System (RCS) thrusters burnthrough on orbit Orbit Orbit
14 1.0 77.0 1.1E-04(1 in 9300) RCS Fuel System external leakage on orbit reacts with O2 on entry Orbit Entry
15 1.0 77.9 1.1E-04(1 in 9300)
Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) Fuel System external leakage 
on orbit reacts with O2 on entry Orbit Entry
16 0.9 78.9 1.0E-04(1 in 9500)
Orbiter inspections (Flight Day 2 and late) produce false positive 
indications of damage, resulting in a failed crew rescue attempt Orbit Orbit
17 0.9 79.8 1.0E-04(1 in 9700) Power Reactant Storage and Distribution (PRSD) tank rupture Orbit Orbit
18 0.9 80.7 1.0E-04(1 in 9800)
External Tank (ET) separation pyro-bolt or frangible nut fail to 
separate (Including Pyrotechnic Intiator Controller (PIC)/NASA 
Standard Initiator (NSI))
Ascent Entry
19 0.9 81.6 9.6E-05(1 in 10,000) Functional failure booster separation motor during SRB separation Ascent Ascent
20 0.9 82.4 9.6E-05(1 in 10,000) SRB separation pyro-bolts fail to separate (includes PIC/NSI) Ascent Ascent
21 0.8 83.3 9.4E-05(1 in 11,000)
Common cause failure of the Electrical Power System (EPS) on 
orbit Orbit Orbit
22 0.8 84.1 9.3E-05(1 in 11,000)
Flight control surface (elevons, rudder, body flap) actuators 
fail/jam during entry Entry Entry
23 0.8 84.9 9.2E-05(1 in 11,000) ET leaks result in fire/explosion Ascent Ascent
24 0.8 85.7 9.1E-05(1 in 11,000) Common cause failure of the APU System on entry Entry Entry
25 0.8 87.0 9.0E-05(1 in 11,000)
Frangible nuts on SRB holdown bolts fail during launch (includes 
PIC/NSI) Ascent Ascent
COMPLETE LIST OF SPRA ITERATION 3.2 
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Rank %age of Total
Cumulative 
Total % Probability Description Phase Initiated Phase Realized
26 0.7 87.8 8.4E-05(1 in 12,000)
Control or mechanical failure causes Main 
Propulsion System (MPS) prevalves to fail to close Ascent Ascent
27 0.7 88.5 7.5E-05(1 in 13,000)
Fuel supply failure to the OMS during orbit and crew 
rescue fails Orbit Orbit
28 0.7 89.1 7.5E-05(1 in 13,000) MPS failures lead to helium overpressure on ascent Ascent Ascent
29 0.7 89.8 7.5E-05(1 in 13,000)
MPS component failures cause a catastrophic 
overpressure condition in the aft compartment 
during entry
Entry Entry
30 0.5 90.3 6.0E-05(1 in 17,000) RCS thruster fail leak or off on orbit Orbit Orbit
31 0.5 86.2 5.7E-05(1 in 18,000)
Orbiter flight software error results in catastrophic 
failure during entry Entry Entry
32 0.5 90.8 5.7E-05(1 in 18,000)
Flow Control Valve (FCV) poppet failure causes 
excessive GH2 ullage pressure resulting in LH2 
venting
Ascent Ascent
33 0.5 91.3 5.5E-05(1 in 18,000) SSME-induced benign shutdown of the SSME Ascent Ascent
34 0.4 91.8 4.9E-05(1 in 20,000) Debonding of TPS during ascent Ascent Orbit, Entry
35 0.4 92.2 4.6E-05(1 in 22,000) APU external leak on ascent Ascent Ascent
36 0.3 92.5 3.9E-05(1 in 26,000) Loss of SRB TPS Ascent Ascent
37 0.3 92.9 3.8E-05(1 in 26,000) Structural failure of the ET during ascent. Ascent Ascent
38 0.3 93.2 3.8E-05(1 in 27,000)
Loss of ET anti-vortex capability leads to SSME 
catastrophic overspeed Ascent Ascent
39 0.3 93.5 3.4E-05(1 in 29,000) Orbiter structural failures Ascent Ascent
COMPLETE LIST OF SPRA ITERATION 3.2 
CONTRIBUTIONS BY SCENARIO (3)
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Rank %age of Total
Cumulative 
Total % Probability Description Phase Initiated Phase Realized
40 0.3 93.8 3.3E-05(1 in 30,000)
Fuel cell leak and a subsequent failure of the crew to 
respond appropriately causes a catastrophic failure Orbit Orbit
41 0.3 94.1 3.2E-05(1 in 31,000)
Water Coolant Loop component failure results in a 
cooling failure on orbit Orbit Orbit
42 0.3 94.4 3.1E-05(1 in 32,000)
Orbit inspections (Flight Day 2 and late) result in 
damage to the TPS Orbit Orbit
43 0.3 94.6 2.9E-05(1 in 34,000)
ET failure causes a fuel feed anomaly, resulting in 
SSME shutdown due to insufficient net positive 
suction pressure
Ascent Ascent
44 0.3 94.9 2.9E-05(1 in 34,000) Landing Deceleration System (LDS) brake failures Entry Entry
45 0.2 95.1 2.7E-05(1 in 38.000)
Common cause failure of the Data Processing System 
(DPS) on orbit Orbit Orbit
46 0.2 95.4 2.5E-05(1 in 40,000)
Mechanisms failure and subsequent failure of a crew 
rescue attempt Ascent, Orbit Orbit
47 0.2 95.6 2.3E-05(1 in 44,000)
Flight Software error result in catastrophic failure 
during orbit Orbit Orbit
48 0.2 95.7 2.1E-05(1 in 48,000)
Flight control surface (elevons, rudder, body flap) 
actuators fail/jam during ascent Ascent Ascent
49 0.2 95.9 2.1E-05(1 in 49,000)
Loss of Active Thermal Control System (ATCS) 
cooling due to ammonia (NH3) tank rupture on orbit Orbit Orbit
50 0.2 96.1 2.0E-05(1 in 51,000)
Pyrotechnic Initiator Controller (PIC) failure during 
SRB ignition Ascent Ascent
51 0.2 96.3 1.9E-05(1 in 51,000)
MPS GO2 or GH2 disconnect valves fail closed, 
causing SSME shutdown due to insufficient net 
positive suction pressure
Ascent Ascent
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Rank %age of Total
Cumulative 
Total % Probability Description Phase Initiated Phase Realized
52 0.2 96.4 1.9E-05(1 in 51,000)
Cabin depressurization due to leaks beyond the make-up capability of 
the Pressure Control System (e.g., penetration leaks) or pressure 
control system fails
Orbit Orbit, Entry
53 0.2 96.6 1.9E-05(1 in 52,000) Active Vent Door (AVD) failure on entry Entry Entry
54 0.2 96.8 1.8E-05(1 in 54,000) MPS disconnect valves fail in the closed position during ascent Ascent Ascent
55 0.2 96.9 1.7E-05(1 in 59,000) Flight Control System (FCS) switching valve fails during entry Entry Entry
56 0.2 97.1 1.7E-05(1 in 59,000) Catastrophic fire/explosion due to MPS interface leakages Ascent Ascent
57 0.1 97.2 1.6E-05(1 in 61,000)
Common cause failure of two APUs, Hydraulic Systems, or WSBs result 
in a failure to land the Orbiter with a single APU in high cross winds Ascent, Entry Entry
58 0.1 97.4 1.4E-05(1 in 73,000)
LDS, APU, hydraulic, or WSB component failure results in a failure to 
properly deploy or a structural failure of the landing gear Entry Entry
59 0.1 97.5 1.3E-05(1 in 74,000)
Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS) O2 
oversupply on orbit leads to fire Orbit Orbit
60 0.1 97.6 1.3E-05(1 in 74,000)
Common cause failure of the Orbiter APU/Hydraulics/Water Spray 
Boiler (WSB) System components during ascent Ascent Ascent
61 0.1 97.7 1.3E-05(1 in 76,000) FCS gear box loses output or jams Entry Entry
62 0.1 97.8 1.3E-05(1 in 77,000)
OMS failure and insufficient RCS propellant (+X jets unavailable) result 
in deorbit failure Orbit Orbit
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63 0.1 97.9 1.3E-05(1 in 80,000) Electrical failure during orbit Orbit Orbit, Entry
64 0.1 98.0 1.2E-05(1 in 81,000)
APU heater fails on and human error failure results in 
catastrophic failure on orbit Orbit Orbit
65 0.1 98.2 1.2E-05(1 in 83,000)
Loss of OMS due to improper targeting of OMS burn (human 
error) Orbit Orbit
66 0.1 98.2 1.0E-05(1 in 96,000)
Common cause failure of Guidance Navigation and Control 
(GN&C) (failure of crew rescue for failures occurring on orbit)
Ascent, Orbit, 
Entry
Ascent, Orbit, 
Entry
67 0.1 98.3 9.9E-06(1 in 100,000)
Cabin Fan System failure combined with a human error during 
landing brought about by high heat or humidity Orbit Entry
68 0.1 98.4 8.3E-06(1 in 120,000)
Independent failure of two APUs, Hydraulic Systems, or WSBs 
result in a failure to land the Orbiter in high cross winds Ascent, Entry Entry
69 0.1 98.5 8.1E-06(1 in 120,000)
MPS liquid H2 feedline flowliner crack leads to fire/explosion 
due to feedline contamination Ascent Ascent
70 0.1 98.5 7.3E-06(1 in 140,000) FCS switching valve fails during ascent Ascent Ascent
71 0.1 98.6 6.6E-06(1 in 150,000) Landing Deceleration System (LDS) tire ruptures Entry Entry
72 0.1 98.7 6.6E-06(1 in 150,000)
Flash Evaporator System freeze up and failure to recover leads 
to LOCV during entry Orbit, Entry Entry
73 0.1 98.7 6.6E-06(1 in 150,000) Rudder speed brake jams during entry Entry Entry
74 0.1 98.8 6.6E-06(1 in 150,000)
Fire/explosion resulting from the auto-decomposition of 
hydrazine due to a leak in the SRB APU fuel pump Ascent Ascent
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75 0.1 98.8 6.1E-06(1 in 160,000)
Trapped fuel due to FRCS failure prior to de-orbit 
preparation combined with failure of recovery 
measures results in CG imbalance
Orbit Entry
76 0.1 98.9 5.9E-06(1 in 170,000)
Common cause failure of all N2 relief valves to close 
on Ascent combined with failure of crew rescue Ascent Orbit
77 0.1 98.9 5.7E-06(1 in 170,000) Fire/explosion caused by MPS contamination Ascent Ascent
78 0.1 99.0 5.7E-06(1 in 180,000)
Icicle formed at the water dump breaks off and 
damages the Orbiter Orbit Entry
79 0.1 99.0 5.6E-06(1 in 180,000)
Drag chute door opens prematurely leading to 
LOCV Ascent, Entry Ascent, Entry
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Fault Tree (FT) System ModelingEvent Tree (ET) Modeling
IE B C D E
End
State
1: OK
2:  LOM
3: LOC
4: LOC
5: LOC
6: LOC
A
Initiating Events Identification
Not A
Link to another fault tree
Basic Event
Logic Gate
End State: ES2
End State: LOC
End State: LOM
Defining the PRA Study Scope and Objectives
Mapping of ET-defined Scenarios to Causal Events
 Internal initiating events
 External initiating events
 Hardware failure
 Human error
 Software error
 Common cause failure
 Environmental conditions
 Other
one or more
of these
elementary
events
One of these events
AND
Event Sequence Diagram  (Inductive Logic)
IE
End State: OK
End State: LOM
End State: ES2
End State: LOC
A B
C D E
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Probabilistic Treatment of Basic Events
The uncertainty in occurrence frequency of an event
is characterized by a probability distribution
Examples (from left to right):
Probability that the hardware x fails when needed
Probability that the crew fail to perform a task
Probability that there would be a windy condition at the time of landing
Communicating & Documenting
Risk Results and Insights to Decision-maker
 Displaying the results in tabular and graphical forms
 Ranking of risk scenarios
 Ranking of individual events (e.g., hardware failure,
human errors, etc.)
 Insights into how various systems interact
 Tabulation of all the assumptions
 Identification of key parameters that greatly influence
the results
 Presenting results of sensitivity studies
 Proposing candidate mitigation strategies
Technical Review of Results and Interpretation
Model Integration and Quantification of Risk Scenarios
Integration and quantification of
logic structures (ETs and FTs)
and propagation of epistemic
uncertainties to obtain
 minimal cut sets (risk
scenarios in terms of basic
events)
 likelihood of risk scenarios

uncertainty in the
likelihood estimates
0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05
20
40
60
80
100
End State: LOM
End State: LOCDomain Experts ensure that system failure logic 
is correctly captured in model and appropriate data 
is used in data analysis
Model Logic and Data Analysis Review
